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Abstract
This note derives the optimal compensation contract with subjec-
tive evaluation when the principal and agent may not agree regarding
performance. The optimal contract takes the form of a bonus pay-
ment whenever the principal believes performance is acceptable, but
with the payment of a penalty by the principal whenever the agent
disagrees with a negative evaluation by the principal. The eﬃciency
of the relationship is increasing with the degree of correlation, a re-
sult that is consistent with the importance of trust for an eﬃcient
employment relationship.
∗I would like to thank Jan Zabojnik for very helpful comments.
11 Introduction
Prendergast (1999) observes that when it is too costly or expensive to use
explicit pay for performance contracts ﬁrms may rely upon subjective com-
pensation contracts.1 However, a diﬃculty with subjective compensation
contracts is that given that the reports are not veriﬁable the principal may
not report truthfully the agent’s performance. Two generic solutions to this
problem have been suggested in the literature.2 The ﬁrst is the use of an
“eﬃciency wage” as suggested by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Under such a
contract the agent is paid a wage that is above her market alternative, and
hence faces a loss if ﬁred. However, the fact that wages are paid above the
market alternative implies that it is costless for the principal to replace the
agent, and hence the principal is indiﬀerent between keeping or ﬁring the
worker. In such a situation the principal has no incentive to misrepresent
performance. An alternative to an eﬃciency wage, is to reward the agent at
the end of the period with bonus pay, with the principal’s reputation ensuring
performance, as suggested by Bull (1987).
MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) show that eﬃciency wages and bonus
pay are two sides of the same coin: as long as the relationship generates a
rent ex post, then the ﬁrm may use either eﬃciency wages or bonus pay. A
key assumption in that analysis is the requirement that the ﬁrm and worker
condition their actions upon the same information.3 This is however a strong
assumption for a subjective evaluation: even reasonable individuals may dis-
agree regarding the quality of performance. The purpose of this note is to
derive the optimal contract with subjective evaluation when agents may dis-
agree regarding quality of performance. Rather than use a complex repeated
game setup, I follow Myerson (1979) and use a very simple mechanism design
approach to show that the optimal contract with subjective evaluation has
the following features:
1. Eﬀort is positive and increasing with the degree of correlation in beliefs
1Prendergast (1999), page 9.
2In this note I shall be concerned with truthful mechanisms only. See Prendergast and
Topel (1996) for discussion of biases in subjective compensation systems.
3Note that it is not necessary for the agents to have perfect information, a noisy signal
will do. What is key is that that both parties condition upon the same, commonly observed
signal. See Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) for further discussion of this point in the context
of repeated games.
2between the principal and agent.
2. Optimal contracts have the feature that a bonus is paid if and only if the
supervisor believes performance is satisfactory. In particular eﬃciency
wage contracts are never eﬃcient.
2 The Model and Result
Consider the following simple model. An agent’s eﬀort is given by λ ∈ [0,1],
where λ is the probability that a beneﬁt B is realized. This eﬀort is produced
at a cost c(λ,), where c(0) = 0 (cost of no eﬀort is zero), c ,c    > 0 (cost of
eﬀort is increasing at an increasing rate) and c  (λ) →∞as λ → 1 (perfection
is impossible). Hence the net surplus of the relationship is given by:
S (λ)=λB − c(λ), (1)
with the ﬁrst best level of eﬀort, λ




Let us assume that these parameters are commonly known, but that the
actual return is realized some distance in the future, and hence cannot be
used for compensation in the current period. For example the agent may be
a software designer, and the product will not go to market for several years,
by which time the designer may have left the company. Instead, assume that
the principal must subjectively evaluate the performance of the agent in the
current period. Suppose that if success does not occur, then both parties
judge performance to be unacceptable (this assumption can be relaxed at
the cost of complicating the analysis). When objective success does occur
the principal and agent may or may not agree upon this. In the event of
an objective success, let λij,i ,j∈{ A,U}, be the probability that the prin-
cipal believes quality is i and the agent believes quality is j, where A and
U denotes “acceptable” and “unacceptable” respectively. Thus if the good
outcome occurs, then λAA is the probability that both principal and agent
agree on this. It is assumed that the signals are positively correlated, that
is λAAλUU − λUAλAU > 0. If the beliefs of the principal and the agent are
perfectly correlated then λAU = λUA =0 .
The principal and agent agree to a contract that makes payments condi-
tional upon messages sent by the principal and agent. Formally the contract
between the principal and agent is given by:
cij = {πij,w ij}, (2)
3where πij,w ij are the payments to the principal and agent under the contract
as a function of the message i,j ∈{ A,U}, satisfying the constraint πij+wij ≤
0. It is well know that if πij+wij =0 , that is the contract is budget balancing,
then there exists no contract that can enforce a positive level of eﬀort.4
Implementation of the contract requires that in certain states an ineﬃcient
allocation occur. How this might occur in practice is discussed in further
below. The formal game describing the relationship is as follows:
1. The principal makes a take it or leave it contract oﬀer to the agent,
who accepts or rejects.
2. The agent selects λ ∈ [0,1], which is his level of eﬀort. This is note
observed directly, but a commonly observed complex output does occur.
3. The principal and agent form subjective judgements regarding the suc-
cess of the agent’s output and simultaneously send messages from the
set {A,U} to the third party enforcing the contract (say upper man-
agement).
4. The payoﬀs are determined.
From the revelation principle we can restrict attention to truth telling
contracts, and suppose the principal is able to select the most eﬃcient con-
tract subject to the incentive constraints. Given that λAAλUU > 0, then the
payments under the contract to the principal and agent when they report k,
but their true state is l are respectively:
π(k|l)=( πkAλlA + πkUλlU)/(λlA + λlU), (3)
w(k|l)=( wAkλAl + wUkλUl)/(λAl + λUl). (4)
The principal’s problem is to maximize expected payoﬀ subject to the
agent’s individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints:
max
λ,c
λB + λπ(c)+( 1− λ)πUU (5)
4Groves and Ledyard (1977) in the context of public goods and Holmström (1982) for
a team production problem have shown the need to break the balanced budget constraint
for eﬃciency. D’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (1979) have a similar result for the public
goods when case when there is asymmetric information, as is the case in this note.
4subject to
λw(c)+( 1− λ)wUU − c(λ) ≥ U
o (6)
w(c) − wUU = c
  (λ) (7)
π(l|l) ≥ π(k|l),k,l∈{ A,U} (8)
w(l|l) ≥ w(k|l),k,l∈{ A,U} (9)
πij + wij ≤ 0,i ,j∈{ A,U} (10)
where π(c)=
 
i,j∈{A,U} πijλij and w(c)=
 
i,j∈{A,U} wijλij are the ex-
pected transfers to the principal and agent respectively when the good out-
come occurs. Constraint 6 requires the agent to earn at least his outside
payoﬀ, constraint 7 is the requirement that the agent select eﬀort to max-
imize his payoﬀ at stage 2. Constraints 8 and 9 are the stage 3 incentive
compatibility constraints ensuring that the principal and agent truthfully re-
port their subjective judgements to the third party enforcing the contract.
The ﬁnal constraint is the budget balancing constraint for the contract.
Proposition 1 Suppose that λAAλUU −λAUλUA > 0. Then the optimal con-
tract with subjective performance evaluation has the form:
Agents Report
AU
Principal’s A (−b − w,b+ w) (−b − w,b + w)
Report U (−P − w,w) (−w,w)
,
where




∗c   (λ
∗)+c  (λ
∗)),
where λA∗ = λAA + λAU is the probability that the principal believes
performance is acceptable.
• The bonus satisﬁes: b = c  (λ
∗)/λA∗.




• The penalty satisﬁes P = c  (λ
∗)/λAAλA∗.
5Proof. Observe that without loss of generality we can initially set wUU =
0 and πUU =0since the incentive constraints are linear, and hence these
values simply determine the payoﬀ levels and can be rescaled to satisfy the
IR constraint. The optimization problem is solved in two stages. First we ﬁx
the expected payment to the agent when there is a success w(c)=¯ w, which






πUU = wUU =0 (12)
w(c) ≥ ¯ w (13)
π(l|l) ≥ π(k|l),k,l∈{ H,L} (14)
w(l|l) ≥ w(k|l),k,l∈{ H,L} (15)
πij + wij ≤ 0,i ,j∈{ H,L} (16)




subject to : Ay ≤ c (18)
by letting the choice variable and parameters be
y =[ πAA,π AU,πUA,w AA,w AU,w UA]
T (19)
a =[ λAA,λ AU,λ UA,0,0,0]
T (20)
c =[ −¯ w,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]
T (21)













−λAA −λAU λAA 000

















6The ﬁrst row is the negative of the payoﬀ to the agent when there is a
success, a constraint that is always binding. The second and third rows
are the incentive constraints for the high and low type principals, while the
fourth and ﬁfth rows are the similar incentive constraints for the agent. The
last three rows are the budget constraints.
We solve this problem by showing that the contract given in the theorem
solves this linear programing problem, that is y∗ =[ −b,−b,−P,b,b,0]. By
the complementary slackness theorem this is optimal if there is an x ∈  8
+
such that ATx = a and xivi =0for every i, where v = c − Ay∗. Notice
that for y∗ the incentive constraints for the agent are satisﬁed automatically,
and hence v4 = v5 =0 . The principal will set total compensation as low
as possible hence b = w(c)/λA∗ = ¯ w/λA∗, where λH∗ = λAA + λAU is the
probability that the principal has a high signal. This implies that v1 =0 .
The penalty P is to provide an incentive to the principal to reveal that she
has observed a good signal. Since it involves a social cost, then it will be
made as small as possible to ensure that the principal’s incentive constraint
is binding, or
−b ≥− Pλ AA, implying (23)
P = b/λAA = ¯ w/(λAA × λA∗). (24)
This implies that v2 =0 . Notice that λAAλUU − λUAλAU > 0 implies that
the principal’s second constraint is automatically satisﬁed. The ﬁrst of the
two budget constraints is satisﬁed with equality, and hence v6 = v7 =0 .
Therefore we need to ﬁnd an x∗ =[ x1,x 2,0,x 4,x 5,x 6,x 7,0]
T ≥ 0 satisfying

















all of which are strictly positive under the hypothesis that λAAλUU−λAUλUA >
0.
If λAU =0the optimal contract has the same form, except that when the
agent has a high evaluation he has strict incentives to reveal his information,
7implying that v4  =0 , and hence we need to allow x4 ≥ 0. In addition since
the principal receives zero from the cell AU, this implies that both of her
incentive constraints are binding, and hence we must now allow x3 ≥ 0.
Thus we must ﬁnd x∗ =[ x1,x 2,x 3,0,x 5,x 6,x 7,0]
T ≥ 0 satisfying ATx = a,











x6 = λUA+ λAA
x7 =0
. (26)
This demonstrates that the optimal contract takes the form of a bonus
to the agent whenever the principal has a high signal. The only role played
by the agent’s signal is to provide incentives for truthful revelation by the
principal. The expected bonus pay is λλA∗b. In addition the principal pays
to a third party an expected penalty λ
λUA
λAAb. The principal now chooses the














λλA∗b + w − c(λ) ≥ U
o (28)
λA∗b = c
  (λ) (29)
from which we obtain the expressions in the proposition.
Under this contract the agent’s payment is independent of his report, and
hence he has no incentive to misrepresent his self-evaluation. The principal
provides the agent with eﬀort incentives by paying him a bonus whenever
she believes that he has provided acceptable performance. If the principal
reports unacceptable performance when the agent reports acceptable, then
she must pay a penalty P. It is the prospect of paying a penalty when the
reports from the agent and principal diﬀer that provides the appropriate
incentives for truthful revelation by the principal.
8When correlation is imperfect and λUA > 0, there is a positive proba-
bility that the principal will pay the penalty. Given that the size of the
penalty depends upon the size of the bonus promised, the lack of correla-




∗c   (λ
∗)+c  (λ
∗)), the amount by which the marginal beneﬁt
from eﬀort is reduced in the optimal contract. Thus if the probability of the
principal having a poor evaluation when the agent has a positive evaluation
is zero we obtain the ﬁrst best eﬀort level, even though the evaluation is
imperfect.
This result shows that the optimal contract is structured so that the
principal’s evaluation determines whether or not the agent receives a bonus,
while the role of the agent’s evaluation is to provide the necessary incentives
for the principal to be truthful. An eﬃciency wage contract has the worker
and not the ﬁrm pay the penalty. In the context of this model the eﬃciency
wage contract would take form:
Agents Report
AU
Principal’s A (−w,w) (−w,w)
Report U (−w,w − P) (−w,w − P)
Given that the principal’s payoﬀ does not depend upon her report, it is
an equilibrium for the principal to report A if and only if her judgement is
A. The penalty P can be choosen to achieve any desired eﬀort level, and
therefore this contract satisﬁes the incentive constraints, but is not eﬃcient.
Also notice that it is possible to have an incentive contract that pays a bonus
whenever the agent self-reports high performance, with a penalty paid by the
agent whenever there is disagreement with the principal, however this is not
optimal. The diﬃculty is in that case the agent is receiving pay that depends
both upon performance and his reporting strategy, diluting the performance
incentives. At the optimal contract each individual is receiving a reward for
correctly carrying out their respective tasks: eﬀort provision by the agent
and monitoring by the principal.
93 Discussion
In this note it is shown that the optimal contract with subjective compensa-
tion entails a bonus to be paid to the agent whenever he is judged to have
carried out acceptable performance by the principal. Moreover, the optimal
contract entails a deadweight loss to the principal whenever there is a dis-
agreement regarding performance between the principal and agent. I have
worked out the optimal contract in a simple static framework that highlights
the role of the budget breaking penalty P in the formation of an optimal
contract. This model is related to many previous papers set in a dynamic
framework where the issue centers upon how to generate the penalty P to
provide incentives for performance, but do not explicit address the question
of optimality when there are correlated beliefs. In those papers P is gener-
ated by continuation strategies in a repeated game that are interior to the
set of feasible payoﬀs (see Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)).
In practice we do not observe the use of money burning to provide in-
centives, however there are examples of mechanisms that are substitutes for
money burning. For example if the ﬁrm makes relation speciﬁc investments
( Becker (1975) and Williamson (1975)), this creates a loss to the ﬁrm when
a worker quits because of a disagreement with a supervisor. Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984) have shown that unemployment can create a loss to ﬁred
workers that enforces high eﬀort, though such a contract can only be eﬃ-
cient if the beliefs of the worker and ﬁrm are perfectly correlated, and there
is no monitoring error. Holmström (1982) discusses how the ﬁrm as a residual
clamant can break the budget balancing constraint, while Carmichael (1983)
and Malcomson (1984) illustrate the use of tournaments to achieve the same
objective. Bull (1987), Kreps (1990) and Baker and Murphy (1997) empha-
size the importance of ﬁrm reputation, whose loss due to disagreements with
employees would correspond to the penalty P. This note complements this
work by showing that it is more eﬃcient for the ﬁrm rather than the worker
to hold the reputation.
T h er e s u l ta l s oh i g h l i g h t sap o i n tt h a ti so f t e nm a d ei nt h em a n a g e m e n t
literature, namely that the eﬃciency of employment depends upon the degree
of “trust” between workers and management. In the context of this model
trust is formally represented by the degree of correlation in beliefs. A next
step might be the derivation of the optimal contract with subjective evalu-
ation in the presence of some contractible measures, as explored in Baker,
10Gibbons, and Murphy (1994) and Pearce and Stacchetti (1998).
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